What are our obligations to extremely numerous animals that we believe are unlikely to have moral standing (e.g., the ~440 quintillion nematodes)?
Context and Relevance:
The ethical consideration of extremely numerous animals, such as nematodes, raises philosophical questions about moral standing and the extent of our ethical obligations towards them. This inquiry delves into whether the concept of Pascal’s Mugging applies to cases involving vast numbers of entities with potentially minimal moral standing. Understanding these issues is crucial for developing coherent ethical frameworks that account for varying levels of moral consideration based on subjective probabilities and ethical demandingness.
Potential Research Approach:
Philosophical Analysis: Conduct a conceptual analysis of Pascal’s Mugging in the context of moral standing and ethical obligations towards numerous but minimally morally significant entities.
Subjective Probability Threshold: Explore ethical theories and decision-making frameworks to determine if there exists a subjective probability threshold below which moral consideration for animals is deemed negligible.
Objections and Responses: Examine demandingness objections to ethical theories and consider various responses that justify or limit our obligations towards numerically vast but morally uncertain entities.
Additional Questions:
How does the concept of Pascal’s Mugging apply to ethical dilemmas involving vast numbers of minimally morally significant animals like nematodes?
What ethical theories or frameworks provide guidance on setting subjective probability thresholds for including animals in moral considerations?
How can ethical theories effectively address objections related to the demandingness of moral obligations towards numerous but minimally morally significant entities?